We show that the standard argument according to which supply function equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function competition and Cournot competition yield a unique Nash equilibrium, whereas price setting yields a continuum of Nash equilibria. There are parameter regions in which Bertrand pro…ts are higher than Cournot ones, with the latter being higher than in the supply function equilibrium. Such reversal of the typical ranking occurs when price-setting mimics collusion. We then show that the reversal in pro…ts is responsible for a reversal in the welfare performance of the industry.
Introduction
There is little doubt about Cournot and Bertrand models being considered the most popular stylised representations of market games. However, there are markets characterised by sellers (and/or buyers) competing in supply (and/or demand) schedules: wholesale electricity, for instance, well …ts such a setting in many countries. 1 Despite the by now huge literature, it is still an open question "whether the price or quantity competition model is the better …t for di¤erent oligopolistic markets, and the supply function model appears to be an attractive model" (Vives, 2011 (Vives, , pp. 1919 . When modelling oligopolistic industries, an interesting question deals with ranking equilibria associated to di¤erent types of market competition. More precisely, one is likely interested in detecting and comparing predictions stemming -coeteris paribus -from equilibria in di¤erent strategies. If we con…ne the attention to Nash equilibria under the three aforementioned types of oligopolistic competition (quantities, prices, supply functions), since Klemperer and Meyer (1989) it has been claimed that the supply function equilibrium ranks intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot ones. Within static models of industries populated by identical …rms producing homogeneous output, pro…ts have been shown higher under quantity competition than under supply function competition, and higher in the latter setting than under Bertrand rules.
In this paper, we challenge such conclusion within a simple oligopoly game where Bertrand competition yields a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that there exist parameter regions in which Bertrand pro…ts are higher than Cournot ones, which in turn are higher than in the supply function equilibrium. the reversal in pro…t ranking drives a reversal in the standard welfare ranking. Intuitively, the reversals occur the higher the marginal cost and larger the departure from marginal cost pricing in the Bertrand game. In such a parameter constellation price-setting mimics collusive behaviour. 1 See Klemperer and Meyer (1989) for other examples, and Grossman (1981) . An excellent introduction to supply function equilibria is Vives (1999, ch. 7).
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the related literature and locates our contribution in the research …eld. Section 3 presents the setup and the equilibria generated by the three di¤erent types of competition. Section 4 compares equilibrium pro…ts and section 5 compares equilibrium levels of social welfare. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
We may group the contributions closest to ours into three streams. The …rst one, starting from the mid 1980s, focusses on the comparison between the properties of Nash equilibria under price-and quantity-setting behaviour under di¤erent speci…cation of technologies, demand and symmetry (or the lack thereof) across …rms. A selection of the most quoted papers includes Singh and Vives (1984) , Cheng (1985) , Vives (1985) , Okuguchi (1987) , Qiu (1997) , Häckner (2000) , Zanchettin (2006) . The focus of this discussion is about the relative performance of prices vs quantities in terms of pro…tability and social welfare, and the pivotal issue is the degree of symmetry across …rms, especially in terms of productive technology, demand level and their interplay with product di¤erentiation. The usual conclusion whereby Bertrand is less pro…table and more e¢ cient than Cournot can ‡ip over in presence of a suf…ciently high degree of cost and demand asymmetry (see Zanchettin, 2006 ). 2 The entire discussion taking place in this subset of the literature considers models delivering unique equilibria in the relevant strategic variable.
The second stream of literature has been pioneered by Dastidar (1995) who has proved the existence of a continuum of pure-strategy equilibrium prices in an homogeneous oligopoly. The properties of Bertrand-Nash equilibria have been investigated also by Dastidar (1997 Dastidar ( , 2011 under di¤erent speci…cations of the cost functions, under the assumption of product homogeneity. The interesting paper by Saporiti and Coloma (2010) presents new results and an extremely helpful taxonomy of the most recent contributions on price competition. The focus of this portion of the literature is about the uniqueness of pure (or mixed) strategy equilibrium price depending on the speci…cation of the cost function, also including …xed components.
Finally, there is a smaller group of papers concerned with competition in supply functions. This literature was initiated by Grossman (1981) and especially Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , who consider an oligopolistic game with demand uncertainty. More recent papers include Delgado and Moreno (2004) and Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), to which we shall refer again later.
Our contribution crosses the aforementioned streams as we compare Bertrand, Cournot and supply functions equilibria in an industry where price-setting yields a continuum of Bertrand equilibria in pure strategies, the good is homogeneous, all …rms are endowed with the same technology displaying increasing variable costs and no …xed ones.
Setup and the three games
Here we describe an industry by means of assumptions that make tractable a model otherwise very complex, especially as for then case in which strategies are functions (the supply function case). Moreover, our functional speci…ca-tion of demand and technology will allow us a complete comparison of the three types of market games equilibria.
Consider a market supplied by a set N = 1; 2; 3; :::; n of identical …rms producing a homogeneous good whose direct demand function is Q = max f0; 1 pg ; where Q = n i=1 q i is aggregate output, q i is …rm i's output and p is price. Production takes place at decreasing returns to scale, and technology, shared by all …rms, is summarised by the strictly convex cost function C i = cq 2 i =2. Accordingly, the pro…t function of …rm i is
where
Firms play simultaneously a non-cooperative one-shot game under complete, symmetric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the Nash equilibrium.
Under Cournot competition, the relevant …rst order condition (FOC) for …rm i is the following:
and the symmetry condition (q j = q i = q for all i and j) yields the unique Cournot-Nash individual equilibrium output and price
The resulting equilibrium pro…ts are
In modelling the price-setting game, we follow Dastidar (1995) , where it is shown that, if costs are strictly convex in output levels and demand is decreasing in price, Bertrand competition yields a continuum of Nash equilibria when …rms are identical. More precisely, the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies involves all …rms setting the same price p 2 [p avc ; p u ] : At the lower bound p avc ; equilibrium price equals average variable costs, so that …rms would be indi¤erent between producing or not. At the upper bound p u ; the equilibrium price is such that …rms would be indi¤erent between playing p u or marginally undercutting it in order to serve the entire market demand.
Without delving further into the details of the derivation of the continuum of price equilibria (see Dastidar, 1995 , pp. 27-28; and Gori et al. 2014, pp. 373-75), the spectrum of equilibrium prices is identi…ed by
where is a non-negative parameter whose range, to be speci…ed below, determines the continuum of equilibrium prices. The associated individual output is
and pro…ts are
As far as parameter is concerned, it is worth noting that:
1. in = 0; the equilibrium price equals average variable cost;
2. at = n=2; marginal cost pricing obtains;
3. if = n 2 = (1 + n) ; p BN reaches the highest level above which undercutting takes place.
Consequently, the admissible range is 2 [0; n 2 = (1 + n)] : For future reference, we de…ne sup := n 2 = (1 + n) :
The following result will become useful in the remainder:
Proof. The di¤erence between the two equilibrium prices is
where the denominator is positive since sup < n. Hence, the sign of (8) The interpretation of the above Lemma is that Bertrand equilibrium price exceeds the Cournot one in the admissible range of when the cost function is su¢ ciently steep and is such that the Bertrand-Nash price departs enough from marginal cost.
In modelling supply function competition, we adopt the same approach used by Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), which o¤ers a simple tool for solving the supply function game originally formulated by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Given the linear-quadratic form of the pro…t function (1), one may formulate the conjecture that supply functions are linear in price. Therefore, we de…ne the supply function of …rm i as s i = i p; i > 0. The market clearing price solves
from which we have
Hence, we may rewrite the individual pro…t function as follows:
This amounts to saying that, if …rms compete in supply functions, their set of strategic variables is the vector of i 's, one for each …rm. The FOC is:
Imposing symmetry across …rms, as the second order condition is met, the unique equilibrium strategy solving the above equation is
which is clearly positive for all admissible values of c and n. The associated equilibrium price, individual output and pro…ts are
SF N = 2n + (n + c)
with q SF N and SF N being strictly positive over the entire parameter range.
Ranking equilibrium pro…ts
In Klemperer and Meyer (1989, pp. 1258-59) , it is shown that the equilibrium pro…ts generated by competition in supply functions are intermediate between those generated by Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, when the latter is restricted to marginal cost pricing. Without repeating the full proof, it su¢ ces to note that, in our model, the sign of CN SF N is the sign of
as can be easily ascertained using (4) and (16); the sign of the above expression is clearly positive. Under marginal cost pricing, it would also be true that CN > SF N > BN for all n 2, as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) . However, here we are dealing with a continuum of price equilibria ranging well above marginal cost pricing. Since Betrand-Nash equilibrium pro…ts BN are a function of , our strategy consists in searching for admissible intervals of in which BN overcomes SF N and even CN .
We start by comparing BN and CN : The expression
Now note that lim
and
Since CN > SF N from Proposition 1, this immediately implies:
The relevant region is drawn in Figure 1 , in the space (c; ). 
with
in such a way that, indeed, BSF 2 > BSF 1 and lim c!0 BSF 1 = lim c!0 BSF 2 = n: The region where BN > SF N ; identi…ed in (23), is drawn in Figure 2 . (28) By the same token, one can verify that BC1 > BSF 1 in the same space fc; ng. This delivers Figure 3 , where the set of curves f BSF 1 ; BSF 2 ; BC1 ; BC2 g are drawn. The intuition behind the ranking in region I can be explained as follows. This region is featured by (comparatively) high values of both and c. Recalling Lemma 1, one may explain the chain of inequalities emerging in region I on the basis of the inequality between p BN and p CN . When and c are high enough, the Bertrand-Nash price ranks …rst, price-setting …rms implementing a quasi-collusive outcome. In region I, Bertrand behaviour outperforms both Cournot and supply function competition from the …rms'standpoint. One may then conjecture that, for any c > c BC1 ; if is larger than BC1 ; welfare levels rank opposite to pro…ts. This is indeed what we are about to show in the next section.
Ranking equilibrium welfare levels
De…ne social welfare as SW KN = n KN + CS KN ; where K = B; C; SF and
is consumer surplus, de…ned in terms of industry output
Since the welfare level is proportional to the industry output, for the sake of simplicity we may restrict our attention to industry outputs across equilibria. To begin with, we compare Q SF N against Q CN :
which is positive everywhere. Then, The above Proposition has a natural explanation, in that when Bertrand pro…ts rank …rst, this happens through an output restriction and a price increase, which of course is detrimental to welfare.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a simple linear-quadratic model of homogeneous oligopoly allowing a fully- ‡edged comparative analysis of di¤erent market games. We have shown that the standard ranking among, price, quantity and supply function equilibria may be reversed for pro…ts as well as social welfare levels. The reason why equilibrium pro…ts (welfare) may be higher (lower) under price competition than under quantity and supply function competition lies in …rms being able to price well above marginal cost in the Bertrand game. Such an ability stems from the convexity of the cost function and the resulting continuum of pure-strategy equilibrium prices. This reversal of the standard pro…t and welfare rankings occur when price competition mimics collusive behaviour. Hence, the convexity of the cost function may prevent ranking the supply function equilibrium as intermediate between price and quantity equilibria.
